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STANCE: We wanted to reiterate our thanks to you for being here. We’re all 
super excited and grateful that you could interview with us. For our first 
question, we were wondering what your undergraduate years as a philosophy 
student were like, and how are they related to how you do philosophy now? 
MANNE: I was primarily interested in logic as an undergraduate. 
I studied with Greg Restall and Graham Priest at the University 
of Melbourne. In some ways, that’s very different from what 
I do now. I would say, though, those years doing logic in 
the philosophy department and also the computer science 
department gave me a certain amount of confidence that stood 
me in good stead for graduate school and made me able to 
change course when I became interested in ethics and feminist 
philosophy. 
STANCE: We’ve noticed some of the major themes in your work are misogyny 
and entitlement. Could you give us a gloss of these concepts and talk about 
how they’re connected? 
MANNE: Absolutely. My definition of 
misogyny is opposed to what I call the 
naive definition of misogyny. The naive 
definition of misogyny says that misogyny 
is the hatred of any and every woman 
and girl or, at least, women and girls very 
generally. I oppose that definition and 
propose something more structural and 
social rather than psychological. I define 
misogyny as a system that functions to 
police and enforce a patriarchal order by 
visiting women and girls with hostility 
and hatred, paradigmatically because 
they violate patriarchal norms and 
expectations. That immediately led me 
to this question: what are patriarchal 
norms and expectations, especially in 
a superficially egalitarian milieu like 
America today? 
My answer to that is contained in my second book, which 
discusses the concept of entitlement. I think there are still 
norms and expectations that say that privileged men, at least, 
are entitled to certain goods from women, things like sex, 
most obviously, but still more insidiously, things like care, love, 
attention, admiration, as well as power and claims to knowledge. 
So, I don’t offer a definition of the concept of entitlement. I think 
it’s difficult to define. I think there are various semi-synonyms 
for the concept of entitlement, like what someone has a right to, 
what someone is owed, or what they deserve. These are all ways 
of getting a similar idea of what someone is due. 
STANCE: Diving more into your work, we have a question about “Chapter One” 
of Down Girl. You say misogynist hostilities will often target women quite 
selectively rather than targeting women across the board. You give examples of 
Rush Limbaugh, Donald Trump, and even Elliot Rodger, the Isla Vista killer. Do 
you think men with hostile attitudes purposely look for women who are acting 
against the patriarchy, or are their hateful displays reactive? 
MANNE: That’s a great question. I think 
their hateful displays are almost always 
reactive and not any kind of deliberate 
attempt to enforce the patriarchal order. 
They’re typically—and I think I can say this in 
all of those three cases—reactions to women 
who thwart, cross, or challenge these men 
in some way, or perhaps a bit more broadly, 
who violate their sense of what women 
owe men. In the case of Elliot Rodger, 
there was the sense that he was owed sex, 
love, affection, and admiration from “hot 
blonde girls.” His subsequent reaction was 
very volatile and violent when he felt he 
wasn’t being given what he believed he was 
due. That went hand in hand with a lot of 
moralistic rhetoric. 
He said, for example, that it was very unfair, that he’d been done 
a great injustice, that it was a crime. So, it’s not so much that 
he was looking for people to punish. It’s rather that he felt like 
he’d been done a grave injustice or harm and that his reaction—
revenge or retribution—was deserved. It was striking. He called 
the final YouTube video that he uploaded before committing his 
murders “The Day of Retribution.” Again, you find this highly 
moralistic attitude purveyed by misogynists. I think that’s also 
true of Rush Limbaugh. He ironically thought that Sandra Fluke 
was acting overly entitled to contraception, in holding it should 
be covered under health insurance at the religious institution 
of Georgetown, where she was in law school. He advertised the 
view that these women were doing him and his listeners, qua 
American taypayers, an injustice by acting overly entitled to birth 
control. 
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Donald Trump is usually someone who lashes out very reactively 
when women thwart, cross, or challenge him. A classic example 
of that would be when Megyn Kelly challenged him during a 
debate saying, “How will you represent women, given that your 
record on women is not very good?” She challenged him on the 
likelihood of his being able to do justice to women when it came 
to health care. He said, “She had blood coming out of her eyes 
and her wherever,” thereby coining a new euphemism for the 
vagina. He was painting Megyn Kelly as the aggressor in doing 
that. He was acting like he was the one who was the victim or the 
one who’d been done an injustice or wrong, and his hostility took 
the form of portraying her as the perpetrator. 
STANCE: Let’s move to “Chapter Three” of Down Girl. You argue abortion 
wasn’t a significant religious issue until the Nixon campaign made it one. How 
much of a role does religion play in enforcing misogynist ideals, or is religion 
really just another part of the sexist framework within patriarchy? 
MANNE: That is a tricky question to answer because religion is 
so diverse. I’d be very hesitant to make any broad brush strokes 
or sweeping claims about the role of religion. For one thing, 
many world religions don’t have a particularly oppressive 
attitude toward women or particularly sexist attitudes. I think 
contemporary Buddhism is perfectly friendly to, and compatible 
with, feminist ideals, for example. But even if we’re looking 
more narrowly within Christianity, we shouldn’t lose sight of a 
very progressive and, to my mind, salutary Christian left, who 
try to make things better for girls and women. I think of it more 
as there being certain political movements, such as the anti-
abortion movement, that are very regressive and look to fairly 
small and local elements of institutions, including religious 
institutions, to essentially exploit people into thinking their 
vote should go to Republicans because of what are essentially 
trumped-up issues like abortion. But this wasn’t a major issue 
for anyone but strict Catholics during most of the 20th century, 
up until the early 70s, and prior to Roe v. Wade. My point is 
mostly that it was a drummed-up issue, that it wasn’t a grassroots 
campaign against abortion that led to it becoming a big political 
issue in this country. It wasn’t actually Roe v. Wade. It was a 
deliberately engineered attempt to manipulate people into voting 
Republican by making this more of an issue than it actually was to 
most religious people prior to the early 70s. 
STANCE: In Down Girl “Chapter Six,” you discuss how women are rewarded 
by society when they engage in behaviors that don’t threaten the patriarchal 
system. However, when they become a victim of misogyny and speak out 
against it, their credibility is questioned, or their perpetrator is shown sympathy, 
especially if the perpetrator is of a higher status or position than the victim. 
You call the show of sympathy for perpetrators “himpathy.” Some of us have 
experienced the harms of what you call “himpathy.” Could you talk about what 
some good responses are when one is harmed this way?
MANNE: First of all, I’m very sorry for 
anyone who has had that experience 
of not being given the sympathy one is 
owed as a victim of injustice, misogynist 
hostility, sexual harassment, or assault. 
In terms of responses, my hope is that the 
coining the concept of “himpathy” can 
help both victims themselves and also their 
allies or accomplices to push back against 
“himpathetic” reactions. When someone 
says, “Oh poor him,” because he is being 
held accountable for doing something that 
was misogynistic, such as sexual assault, and 
isn’t thinking about his current or future 
victims, I hope that with the concept of 
“himpathy,” we can draw attention to that 
dynamic and how harmful it is, and redirect 
sympathetic attention to where it primarily 
belongs, namely to the victim of a sexual 
assault. 
I hope that can be one good response, that people who are 
trying to be moral can be woken up to realize they are directing 
their sympathetic attention where it doesn’t primarily belong; 
that, actually, they should be focusing more on the victim than 
the perpetrator. Sympathy is a good thing. It’s just that it can 
be misdirected in various, important ways. Sometimes what 
you have is a case of someone well-meaning, well-intentioned, 
and who has good moral instincts, who has, nonetheless, been 
redirected in their emotions by patriarchal forces and who could 
perhaps be woken up to realize they are sympathizing essentially 
with the wrong person, at least in the first instance. 
STANCE: As you discussed, women that are victims of sexual assault and then 
are met with “himpathy” can experience it as gaslighting. In particular, it can 
cause a person to believe they are not justified in blaming the perpetrator. Do 
you think a better understanding of “himpathy” can reduce the injustice that 
results from victims doubting their understanding of their experiences? More 
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generally, how might an understanding of “himpathy” help people make sense 
of their experiences and combat injustices?
MANNE: That’s another excellent 
question. I definitely think the 
phenomenon of gaslighting intersects in 
interesting ways with “himpathy.” One 
of the ways it does that, as you point 
out, is by making people feel guilty or 
ashamed for hanging onto the truth about 
what happened to them, or about what 
some bad actor did, or about what some 
institution is really like. In the most classic 
cases, gaslighting preys on someone’s 
sense of what is rational to believe. It 
can make someone “crazy,” or allege that 
someone is “crazy,” for not buying into 
the gaslighter’s version of reality. But, 
just as importantly, it can make someone 
feel guilty, as if they are a bad person. 
Gaslighting dismisses victims as either 
irrational or immoral for maintaining 
their own correct version of reality. It 
can make it extremely difficult to hang 
onto the truth in the face of both social 
power and rational and moral pressure 
to bend to another person’s version of 
reality, when they strongly insinuate you’d 
be crazy or bad for not agreeing with 
what they say. So, it’s a way that people 
in dominant social positions—perhaps 
typically, but by no means exclusively, 
men—can effectively control the narrative 
and make people stick to a particular 
version of reality without it being true or 
at all compelling in terms of the evidence 
for it. 
Sometimes gaslighters even succeed in having people assert what 
they know to be false, which is a quite striking social achievement 
in the face of the actual evidence or the epistemic facts. Again, 
my hope is that authors that have drawn attention to the 
phenomenon of gaslighting—and in the philosophy world these 
are people like Kate Abramson, Veronica Ivy, and many other 
authors—can help provide tools for victims to resist being gaslit. 
I think it’s very powerful to think this is a more general dynamic; 
you are not actually crazy or bad for maintaining your side of 
the story. You can understand you are being subject to undue 
pressure to cave, and maybe resist a particular mechanism that 
would try to make you abandon an important truth about what’s 
happened to you, or about the world.  
STANCE: In several of your works, you describe how women are expected, by 
society, to be psychological and moral nurturers or caretakers for the men and 
children in their lives. If moral nurturing helps children develop healthy psycho-
social habits, how can we support this moral nurturing without stereotyping 
women and making women do an unjust amount of caregiving?  
MANNE: That’s really important, 
because I would hate for my work to be 
misunderstood as devaluing typically 
feminine-coded traits, activities, and 
virtues. It seems to me that caregiving is 
tremendously important. It will always need 
doing. It’s humanly valuable, meaningful 
work. I think my argument here is really 
simple. I think men should do just as much 
caregiving, and should be socialized to view 
it as just as much their work, as women 
and girls. Everyone, be they man, woman, 
boy, girl, non-binary adult or child, should 
view themselves as responsible for caring 
for those around them in ways that are 
sustainable, warm, and loving, and also, 
when appropriate, reciprocal. When adults 
care for each other, that can be done in a 
reciprocal way, and there can be something 
very affirming about the possibility that 
both partners, including in a straight or 
heterosexual relationship, might be able 
to get what they need from each other, and 
also give each other what they need. So, I 
think of these ideals as really egalitarian, 
and not as questioning the value of care.
STANCE: Do you believe that there are certain neurobiological predispositions 
in men and women to approach nurturing in different ways? Or, do you believe 
those are entirely due to social norms? And if they’re biological, should they 
be accounted for and respected? Or, is it the responsibility of an individual to 
overcome it and share the nurturing role equally?
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MANNE: I think the most striking thing is that it would be very 
difficult to know at this point in human history whether anything 
we observe by way of these gender differences is biological or 
innate. I think that we do have a lot of evidence that there are 
many social processes that make men and women responsive 
to different social norms, and that can shape our behavior. It’s 
possible that there’s a residual biological difference of some 
kind, but I suspect we won’t know for a long time, because we 
don’t have a control group of men and women raised in a non-
patriarchal, gender-neutral society that we could analyze to see 
if there are any remaining gender differences. I tend to proceed 
as if these are all learned and socialized differences because I 
don’t think we lose a lot by acting as if that’s the case, and that’s 
compatible with the possibility that we might eventually learn 
that it’s not the case. If it were the case, I think, as you rightly 
point out, we’ll have an interesting question on our hands having 
to do with the is-ought gap. Even if it is the case that things will 
be slightly easier for men or slightly easier for women, if they are 
good to do, does that mean we should have any gendered division 
of labor, or should women do more or men do less? It’s not clear 
that that’s the case. It might just be that we might need certain 
people to try harder to fulfill their basic moral responsibilities, 
e.g., to care for others around them properly. 
STANCE: This notion of women as nurturing, communal caregivers seems 
incompatible with the idea of them being untrustworthy. Yet, much of your 
work revolves around people not trusting women to lead, to be aware of their 
own bodies, or to tell the truth about sexual assault. Where do you think the 
idea of women being untrustworthy came from? 
MANNE: That’s a really sharp observation. I think women 
are regarded as very trustworthy in certain areas, including 
caregiving. There’s a tendency, occasionally, in the epistemic 
injustice literature, to make statements that are perhaps a bit 
too sweeping, like, “Women are not regarded as knowers.” The 
anecdote I often like to give to cast some doubt on that sweeping 
claim is that I’m regarded as a knower in most of the domains 
that are traditionally feminine. If I’m at the supermarket, people 
often ask me, “What do you do with a rutabaga?” or “How do you 
make a mango curd?” Whereas my husband, who shops with 
the same grocery list, is subject to fewer of those queries. I’m 
not saying it’s wrong to ask people how to cook with ingredients. 
I’m happy to answer those questions. I just think it is interesting 
that men in a completely comparable position within the same 
grocery basket doesn’t get as many of those inquiries. 
I think white women are often regarded as 
highly trustworthy when it comes to caring 
for their own children. And non-white 
women who are positioned as caregivers 
for other people’s children—those subject 
to the “mammy” stereotype discussed by 
Patricia Hill Collins—are often regarded as 
supremely trustworthy with regard to other 
people’s children, like the white children 
that black women were often tasked with 
caring for. It’s when women challenge 
the status quo, or the patriarchal order, 
that their trustworthiness tends to be 
doubted. It’s less the idea that women are 
untrustworthy than that we wheel out this 
ad hoc idea that women are untrustworthy 
when they challenge male dominance or 
threaten a powerful man’s position. We see 
this a lot with the #MeToo movement when 
some women had been silent about certain 
truths in their lives for years and years and 
years, because they knew they wouldn’t 
be believed about that particular matter 
because it was threatening to powerful 
and privileged men. But, that’s perfectly 
compatible with being overly reliant on 
women’s knowledge when it comes to 
caregiving and other feminine coded duties. 
STANCE: Let’s transition to your book Entitled. In “Chapter Seven,” you discuss 
the inequality of housework and caregiving in straight relationships and the 
double bind that this puts women in. The first part of this bind is that if you ask 
your husband for help, you break the social code by expressing unacceptable, 
resentful emotions. Since this is a societal code, is it possible for a straight 
couple to break this double bind and find a healthy balance of who does what? 
Do you think such relationships exist? 
MANNE: Yeah, I am optimistic about that. I think such 
relationships do exist. I think I’m in one. But a lot of hard work is 
required to undo powerful and prevalent social norms that say 
women should do more of the material and domestic and child-
giving labor, while also doing it in a completely seamless, loving, 
and willing spirit—so that they shouldn’t even ask for “help” 
around the house and that they should absorb all the shock of 
extra work that piles up, say, during a pandemic, without having 
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any demands placed on their male partners. It’s both a matter 
of evening the amount of work people do, but also having good 
communication that allows both partners to be in constant 
dialogue about whether things are equal. Is the amount of paid 
and unpaid work appropriately balanced? I think that’s a difficult 
thing to pull off, but it’s perfectly possible. 
STANCE: That’s reassuring. In much of your work, you discuss the concept 
of humanism. Given your argument that humanism doesn’t well explain 
misogyny, what conceptual framework would you use to cover the 
shortcomings of humanism? 
MANNE: I have a very unpithy name for it: a socially situated 
approach to understanding bigotry and hatred. The idea is to 
understand some people as positioned by dint of features like their 
race, their gender, their class, or their intersection, as well as other 
things like being trans, being disabled, being a certain age—such 
marginalized people can be positioned, unfortunately, as somehow 
threatening or even as an enemy or as deviant or as in need of 
being taught a lesson. All sorts of characteristically human faults 
and flaws can be attributed to individuals or groups of people on 
the basis of things like the aforementioned group memberships, 
and that can, thereby, attract very hostile and hateful treatment, 
even though these people are seen as fully human. 
In fact, seeing them as fully human is a 
prerequisite for holding them to be bad, 
deviant, punishable, or in need of policing 
or being taught a lesson. Because we don’t 
generally hold these attitudes towards 
non-human animals, we generally don’t 
regard non-human animals as enemies. 
If we do, it’s some kind of a conceptual 
mistake, crystallized by Moby Dick. The 
idea that a non-human animal can’t 
really be an enemy, because they have 
no conceptualization of you, as such, is a 
powerful and compelling idea enshrined 
by such literature. 
STANCE: Several of your articles talk about the dehumanizing principle, which 
you have long argued does not apply to cases of violence against less privileged 
peoples. How can you see the conversation around these types of violent crimes 
changing based on your ideas? In what ways will recognizing that humanness 
is necessary for the kind of hate directed at these peoples influence the way we 
prosecute perpetrators either morally or judicially? 
MANNE: I think one of the things I hope 
the most is that we let go of a myth about 
perpetrators of brutal violence as having 
made a more or less innocent mistake, of 
just not seeing other people as human, that if 
we’re subject to certain forms of oppression, 
we just need to make our humanity visible 
and legible to the perpetrators. I think 
that’s a really pernicious and damaging 
lie that casts the perpetrators as not fully 
responsible for what they do, because 
they’re just missing something, something 
that could be made plain to them, and 
then, they would see the light morally and 
do better. Also, it tends to place a certain 
amount of responsibility on victims to 
humanize themselves rather than thinking 
of perpetrators as bad actors who fully 
understand the humanity of their victims 
and want to do them a cruelty in spite of 
that, or sometimes precisely because of that.
STANCE: Given the traps of humanism that you elucidate very well in your work, 
do you think it still has a valuable place in the contemporary world? 
MANNE: That’s a really good question that I’ve honestly 
struggled with back and forth. The thing I’ve explicitly argued 
for at the most length in my work is that humanism can’t 
explain all kinds of horrible cruelty and brutal treatment. It 
often can’t explain misogynistic violence that’s premised on 
recognizing the humanity of the victim. But, as I argue in the 
last part of that chapter in Down Girl, if we don’t need to resort 
to the idea of dehumanization to explain some brutal violence, 
there’s this question: do we ever need to invoke this idea? Is 
it useful? Is it consistent with principles of parsimony, or is it 
always surplus to explanatory requirements? That’s a question 
I want to leave open, but I’ve yet to be fully convinced we ever 
need to invoke this mysterious idea that people genuinely see 
others as non-human, subhuman, or non-human animals 
in order to explain brutal violence. I think it also has this 
problematic tendency to exoticize violence and make us think 
that something really radical needs to happen in people’s minds 
to explain violence, as opposed to it being a very ordinary thing. 
As we see with domestic violence, it doesn’t take very much to 
have a situation where societies have prevalent, widespread, 
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horrible violence that a significant 
percentage of women will face, even 
if that’s only perpetrated by a small 
percentage of typically, although not 
always, men. I think the dehumanization 
paradigm looks on society as peaceful 
and then wonders what goes wrong 
when it comes to big, mass movements 
that are violent. Whereas I tend to look 
at society as quite violent, unfortunately. 
Sometimes the forces that may explain 
domestic violence could be unleashed 
on a much broader swath of people in 
ways that require political momentum 
to set loose. That’s at least why I’m a bit 
skeptical that dehumanization has a 
valuable explanatory role to play, but I 
do want to leave that possibility officially 
open.
STANCE: We did want to ask, if dehumanization is not really what’s going on 
in the underlying causes of those sorts of violence, then what sort of things do 
you think are happening when people use dehumanizing language, like when 
Trump compared Mexicans to cockroaches and bugs? 
MANNE: To me, it’s a very general derogating mechanism. We 
have, for better or more likely worse, a hierarchy that places 
God at the top, human beings next, and then, a hierarchy of 
non-human animals pretty much bottoming out in vermin like 
a cockroach. One very powerful way of derogating people is 
to liken them to non-human animals, especially ones that we 
find disgusting or think are disease-carriers like cockroaches. 
I think a lot of other similar, derogating moves rely on other 
hierarchies. It’s of a piece of the fact that Trump will call black 
women “low IQ individuals.” He will help himself to whatever 
hierarchies are salient to him and then derogate people who he 
doesn’t like or who he’s prejudiced against by reaching out to a 
hierarchy and downranking people according to it. Although this 
is obviously controversial, I tend to think the great chain of being 
type of hierarchy is just one hierarchy among many where he’ll 
downrank people by invoking it. It’s not that he literally thinks 
of Mexican people as cockroaches. In reality, he regards people 
from derogated ethnic and racial groups as a threat, and I don’t 
think he would regard people as a threat unless he realized that 
we’re people. 
STANCE: Moving on to some of your stand-alone articles, in “Non-Machiavellian 
Manipulation and the Opacity of Motive,” you argue that sometimes people 
are not consciously aware of much of the manipulative behavior they display. 
Can you relate this concept to the concept of microaggressions? What kind of 
unintentional behaviors of this type should be tolerated by oppressed peoples, 
and how should they be responded to?
MANNE: That’s a really nice question. I hadn’t previously made 
that connection, so I really appreciate the thought. This theme 
you’ve brought out really nicely is in a lot of my work. A lot of 
bad behavior is unintentional. I counsel focusing on the impact, 
not the intention. Manipulation usually isn’t intentional as such. 
People usually don’t set out to manipulate others. They usually 
don’t think, “I’m going to get agent A to do Phi.” They don’t tend 
to think in terms of manipulation. They tend to think, “That’s 
what ought to happen.” 
Similarly, there are a lot of behaviors that 
can be aptly described as microaggressions 
that have this feature of being 
unintentional. They might be questions 
leveled out of genuine curiosity, like “Where 
are you from?” or someone touching 
someone’s hair because they’re unfamiliar 
with that hair texture. These are racist 
behaviors that we need to recognize as 
racist. But that doesn’t require attributing 
to someone, necessarily, a bad motive. I 
tend to think the motive doesn’t particularly 
matter. It’s all about the impact. 
STANCE: In discussions of oppression, what do you think your obligations are as 
a white woman writing about the struggles of women and of other oppressed 
groups?
MANNE: That’s something I’ve thought about and worried about a 
lot, especially since I think of myself as someone privileged along 
really every dimension bar gender. I think of myself as someone 
who is white, albeit Jewish, as middle class, as having institutional 
privilege. I’m straight and I’m cis. All of those things add up to a 
pretty weighty responsibility to listen to the voices of people who 
are in more marginalized communities relative to me and to really 
be attentive to things being said by black women and trans women 
as well as men who are poor or illegalized, about their unique 
experiences of misogyny, misogynoir, or transmisogyny, or classism, 
or xenophobia—things that I won’t personally experience. So, part 
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of the obligation is to listen. Part of the obligation is also to try to 
synthesize some of those observations and try to include those 
perspectives in my work, as well as having the humility to recognize 
that I’ll get it wrong a lot of the time and be unable to fully do justice 
to those vital perspectives. Part of what I want to do is to advert to 
the work of women of color, as well as trans women, and women in 
other demographics, and say that you really need to listen to people 
in these groups; “Here is a resource for understanding misogynoir,” 
or “Here is a resource for understanding transmisogyny.” I can 
gesture towards some of the things I’ve learned from scholars 
in these groups, but I won’t always be able to do justice to the 
experience. It’s a balance between trying to incorporate other voices 
and trying to signal boost to other scholars who are vital to read and 
to listen to on these subjects.
STANCE: That is something that we appreciated when reading your work. 
We noticed that you pointed to a lot of resources that we could look at if we 
wanted to hear from a more diverse perspective. 
MANNE: Excellent. That’s great to hear.
STANCE: “Don’t Trust Your Gut on Hillary: Why the Visceral Suspicion of 
Her Is Predictable—and Untrustworthy” elaborates on the idea of disgust 
driven morals. Disgust can, in some ways, be considered a socially applied 
connotation but also a bodily imperative. For example, an infant that sits in 
their soiled diaper too long and starts to cry does so with their bodily imperative 
of discomfort and disgust; they wish to be clean.  How can one distinguish 
this learned bodily imperative, which is deemed to be universal and non-
negotiable, from truth and fiction? 
MANNE: That’s a very interesting question. As you’re picking up 
on there, I do think of certain bodily imperatives as the heart of 
moral truth. I do think that a baby’s desire to be fed, the piercing 
cry of an infant in the night who needs to be fed, changed, or 
just soothed, represents that bodily imperative on their part and 
represents a moral imperative on the part of the parent to meet 
those needs. As you point out, some bodily imperatives have a 
disgust basis. Feeling dirty and wanting to be clean is a powerful 
bodily imperative, and it’s really tricky. Unfortunately, sometimes 
those bodily imperatives, as they apply to more subtle and 
complicated matters, can become misleading. An example would 
be the sadness of an incel whose bodily imperative is to have 
soothing ministrations from a woman. I think that isn’t a moral 
imperative that anyone should be rushing out to satisfy. Similarly, 
someone’s sense of disgust at a woman in power isn’t a bodily 
imperative that deserves to be satisfied. 
One of the things that differentiates those bodily imperatives from 
ones that ought to be satisfied is the fact that they can be changed 
and learned and unlearned. It’s not universal or non-negotiable to 
have a sense of disgust at a woman’s power. Similarly, an incel’s sense 
of sadness and yearning for a woman to meet his perceived needs—
that’s by no means a universal human condition. It’s a product of 
a sense of entitlement, primarily, and is something that could be 
unlearned and lead to not having that visceral response. So, the 
bodily imperatives that have the most claim to be moral imperatives 
are the ones that are non-negotiable and universal, and really 
couldn’t be otherwise in that particular individual at that time.
STANCE: About universality, in “On Being Social in Metaethics,” you argue that 
much of ethics is influenced by social norms. Under this framework, how do 
you believe social change arises? Are all societies turning towards establishing 
similar social norms or will there always be a large distinction?
MANNE: I think there will often be residual differences in social 
norms between societies. That’s a little beyond my pay grade as 
a philosopher, because that’s really a sociological speculation on 
my part. One of the reasons why social norms differ widely is that 
there are often different norms that essentially have a similar 
function. In different cultures there can be different norms of 
politeness. A friendly wave in one culture might be a gesture of 
disdain in another. 
Even so, I suspect there will be differences. I 
think social norms have more of a claim on 
us, normatively speaking, when they help 
us meet our mutual needs as individuals 
and as a society. One of the ways this jibes 
with the idea of bodily imperatives is that if 
a set of social norms helps everyone’s bodily 
imperatives or most basic imperatives to 
be met—to help us be fed, healthy, happy, 
and content—then there’s more of a claim 
that those norms have genuine normative 
purchase. So, that’s one of the litmus tests 
I propose for social norms that should be 
regarded as moral norms, that they are 
actually conducive to everyone’s bodily 
imperative of a moral kind being satisfied.
STANCE: In “Internalism about Reason: Sad But True,” you convey the idea that 
in order to change someone’s behavior, an agent must connect to them with 
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mutual respect and persuade them to change through ideal reasoning. In a 
patriarchal society that often times deems women not equal to men, in moral 
agency nor respect, is it possible for women to change misogynist behavior? 
Or, must men do it?
MANNE: That’s a very good question. 
The sad thing—another sad truth—is that 
often someone who’s best positioned 
to talk about a lack of social power or 
injustice will, because of that lack of social 
power and because of that very injustice, 
have a difficult time getting through 
to a large number of people. I do think 
there’s an important role for male allies 
or accomplices to talk to people in a clear 
or even sharp way about misogynistic 
behaviors or problems in society. I think 
there’s a role for everyone, whatever their 
degree of privilege, in playing a part in 
helping convince other people of what 
needs to be done in order to achieve 
gender justice, among other kinds of 
justice.
STANCE: In that same article, you state that when we are incapable of 
reasoning with someone through an interpersonal connection, we are left 
with the less effective ability to blame and criticize. Do you think that shaming 
could be a useful middle ground or form of compromise between interpersonal 
reasoning and objective criticism?
MANNE: I’m interested in this possibility because I do think that 
we lose something when we can’t blame someone in the intimate 
sense that presumes that they might do better and that they 
have, themselves, an interest or desire to do better and could be 
persuaded to do better through good reasoning. As you point out, 
I think, along with Williams, that even if we can’t play the blame 
game, we can do other things. We can label them sexist, selfish, 
nasty, brutal, and “other disadvantageous things,” as he put it. 
It’s interesting to think about the idea of shaming as a bridging 
practice. The idea would be that by shaming people, perhaps 
we could bring them back into a community of people who we 
could reason with interpersonally to get them to do better. I like 
the idea. I’m not completely sure that it would work because one 
thing that’s very striking about shame is how aversive it is. People 
do a great deal to avoid being shamed. We see this when we have 
shaming labels, like misogynist and racist, that entail that there’s 
something shameful about fitting that description. People will do 
an enormous amount to avoid being saddled with that label. 
Because I take seriously this property that 
they have, when it comes to the idea of 
being a misogynist, we should apply it 
very sparingly, because people will go to 
such great lengths to avoid it. They won’t 
so much avoid the behavior, but they will 
avoid by various defensive moves having the 
label applied to them, even if it would be 
deserved. So, I think we need shaming labels 
to be warning labels that we apply very 
sparingly to help people avoid misogynists 
and racists. I’m not saying we shouldn’t use 
them. But I don’t see them as having a big 
role in persuasion, because I think people 
tend to flee from their very possibility and 
behave in irrational and often immoral 
ways, rather than facing up to the possibility 
that the label really fits.
STANCE: Do you think the notion of disgust, as you talk about it, has any 
relation to the visceral reaction against those shameful labels that you 
mentioned?
MANNE: Yes. I think it is the first-person analog of third and 
second personal disgust. I think blame and guilt are pairs in that 
way. The first-person internalized analog of blame is guilt. The 
first-person internalized analog of disgust is shame. And, that 
helps explain the fact that it’s so aversive, because it’s a form of 
self-disgust, or it at least shares a lot in common with disgust 
directed at the self. Because of that, people will do an awful 
lot to avoid it, even if they should feel self-disgust, even if they 
should feel shame, for racist or misogynistic behavior. It usually 
does more to alienate than to convince, which doesn’t mean we 
shouldn’t use the labels, but I think we should use them to warn 
others about a misogynist or a racist, not to help people come 
back into the fold, because people who are self-disgusted or who 
are filled with shame are pretty volatile.
STANCE: Sometimes the desire to shame another is primarily about satisfying 
the desire of the shamer. It is very different than giving a gift of moral alarm to 
a person by saying, “I am experiencing something you are doing as harmful 
or problematic.” This is described as a gift, because this also says, “I’m not 
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dehumanizing you or turning you into something I am attempting to control 
with moral force.” Rather, this says, “I want to be in a relationship with you, 
and you are doing something that is making that relationship difficult.” Yet, 
in formal relationships, as opposed to informal ones, there might be a role for 
shame if the potential harm is significant. The point here is that shaming is bad 
most of the time.
MANNE: I really like that observation. It reminds me of the way 
Erik Erikson says, “Shame wants to destroy the eyes of the world.” 
I think that quote is an exaggeration, because there is plenty of 
shame that, rather than wanting to hide from the world, wants 
to divorce your own eyes from the world’s eyes by hiding yourself 
away rather than destroying anything. Nonetheless, there is 
something about shame that severs the sightlines between self 
and other. 
Lashing out behavior, hiding behavior, 
wanting to be invisible, and wanting 
to disappear are all the characteristic 
bodily imperatives that attend shame. 
Because of that, there’s not a whole lot 
we can do with it to restore interpersonal 
connections. Again, I’m not saying it has 
no role. In some circumstances, it is good 
to say certain people are beyond the pale. 
Using a shaming label about Trump, to 
me, helped identify ways in which he was 
harming people who are marginalized by 
his rhetoric and his policies. It could be 
helpful to say he is beyond the pale and 
beyond the reach of reasoning. It is not 
something that helps bring him back into 
the fold. This is something we do when we 
are beyond the training, conversations, 
and reasoning processes that we engage 
with with each other to try to lift all of our 
moral game. It is something we do when 
we realize we need to get away from a 
person and sever a connection. It takes a 
lot to get to that point. 
STANCE: We could decide which term we want to apply to which concept, but 
blaming is frequently good. Blaming is a reaching out to reestablish or reorient 
a relationship in a positive way. But, shaming is a breaking.
MANNE: I totally agree. Blaming is often important in the context 
of an intimate interpersonal relationship. It implies a degree of 
trust and a degree of hope. It holds someone accountable, but for 
a particular behavior that you think they can do better on, and 
that you rightly expected more from them with respect to this. 
Remonstrating with someone by blaming them is very different 
from shaming them for a behavior, attitude, or practice. Blame is 
something that both relies on, and aims to improve and restore, 
interpersonal connections. 
STANCE: We’ve been thinking about the roles misogyny and entitlement play 
in undergraduate philosophy education. Do you have any suggestions for 
how we can reduce the roles of misogyny and entitlement in our academic 
programs while we’re still students? 
MANNE: I am a big believer in the 
kind of thing you are doing, which is 
doing philosophy together with diverse 
practitioners. This can be really helpful. 
Instructors have a big role to play in getting 
together syllabi that are representative of 
a diverse group of people and a diverse 
set of interests, ideas, and philosophical 
problems, including political ones. When 
I teach contemporary moral problems, I 
include a unit on racism and/or misogyny, 
which is a way of helping make the 
discussion a little broader and more 
politically in-tune with people’s current 
concerns, rather than what you might find 
in a textbook. 
Instructors also have a big role to play in doing simple things to 
improve equality within the academy, like calling on everyone 
equally as much as that’s possible. If you are a man, a woman, 
or someone who’s non-binary, and you raise your hand, there 
must be an equal chance of being called upon. That’s often not 
true, sadly, as things stand, because even well-meaning people 
with egalitarian beliefs often exhibit unconscious gender biases 
that have them orient towards white men in the classroom. So, 
there are simple measures we can do to reduce that. Things 
like alternating who you call upon, assuming it is a reasonably 
balanced group of people, or you can modify that if the numbers 
are very skewed. Also, things like anonymous grading are a good 
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the chance of implicit bias, and also to say very deliberately to 
students that I am not above this. 
Gender biases are common, as are 
racial biases, and it is something 
we should all take responsibility for 
minimizing however we can. If you can 
grade anonymously, there is a good 
argument for doing so. I think most of 
the responsibility falls on instructors. 
My hope is that people are increasingly 
open-minded about how to make the 
classroom, and philosophy in particular, 
more welcoming to everyone. 
STANCE: Is there anything that you wished we had asked? Do you have any 
questions that you would like us to answer?
MANNE: I thought your questions were brilliant. I really enjoyed 
them. I would love to hear from you. What is the best thing an 
instructor has done, or could do, to make your undergraduate 
education philosophically or socially richer? 
STANCE: Philosophy professors are really willing to approach you first and work 
with you. I tend to be a quieter student, but I’ve still had lots of professors reach 
out to me and ask if I was interested in doing different things. It’s useful that 
they won’t ignore you just because you’re quiet. 
MANNE: I think that’s so important. I try to make it clear that 
participation needn’t be in one form; it doesn’t just have to be 
speaking up in class. It could be having discussion questions 
that are written that are really good, coming to office hours and 
having one-on-one discussions, or talking after class. 
STANCE: Philosophy classes are very different from my other classes. I love 
seeing how the professors think through the material with you. They’re not just 
lecturing. They are, in a sense, but they are also thinking through the material 
and considering their own thoughts and questions. When you make a point, 
you can see them react and come up with their own new ideas. I have found 
that type of engagement really unique to my philosophy classes, and that’s 
what I really love. 
MANNE: Oh, I love that. One of my favorite things is thinking 
through things together, seeing someone think on their feet, and 
watching students think. Getting to do that thinking-through 
process together is totally what it’s all about.
STANCE: Especially this year, my professors being cognizant of what we’re going 
through has been really nice. 
MANNE: Well, that’s so good to hear. I’ve been really heartened to 
see, not just students, but professors too, rising to this profound 
challenge we have in front of us. I’d love to have an email from 
any of you and follow up on anything. Thank you all so much for 
a great conversation.
STANCE: Thank you.
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